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Cosmopolitanism, self-interest, and world government   
 
 
That a dealer should not overcharge an inexperienced purchaser certainly accords with duty; and where there is 
much commerce, the prudent merchant does not overcharge but keeps to a fixed price for everyone in general, so 
that a child may buy from him just as well as everyone else may. Thus customers are honestly served, but this 
is not nearly enough for making us believe that the merchant has acted this way from duty and from principles 
of honesty; his own advantage required him to do it.  
(Immanuel Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, 1993 [1785]) 
 
For those, like Kant, conducting an investigation into fundamental moral principles, it is 
important to distinguish a moral motivation for acting from a self-interested motivation for 
acting, even where the two motivations encourage the same action. However, when the concern 
is rather how the practical demands of given principles might be realised, it should be recognised 
that self-interest might prove useful. My focus in this paper is how, and in which institutional 
conditions, self-interested motivations might aid the realisation of a cosmopolitan vision of global 
justice.1 I will argue that usefully harnessing three such motivations – which I call economic self-
interest, prudential self-interest and democratic self-interest – requires or strongly implies world 
government. I use this latter descriptor deliberately loosely, intending it to capture both those 
institutional proposals conceptualised as residing between a confederal and federal world order, 
and full world state proposals.2 In both cases, at least some features of genuine government (not 
the weaker vision of ‘global governance’) are present: in particular, sovereign executive authority 
and/or a (democratic) global legislature. My thought is that if the varieties of self-interest I will 
consider here are to motivate behaviour that ‘accords’ with cosmopolitan ends, it will be in an 
institutional context in which one or both of these features are present.  
                                                          
1 We need not assume one specific cosmopolitan theory. Common to all such theories is that principles of 
distributive justice are global in scope, and are to be relationally understood, entailing the limitation or 
eradication of inequalities in a given metric between persons worldwide.  
2 For examples of the first type see Archibugi, 2008; Caney, 2005; Held, 1995; Pogge, 2002; Habermas, 
2006. For examples of the latter type see Cabrera, 2004; Marchetti, 2008.  
2 
 
 
 World government is sometimes a direct implication of cosmopolitan principles: where 
one makes a cosmopolitan case for globalised representative democracy, for instance, one is 
necessarily at the same time making the case for at least some features of world government (e.g. 
a global parliament). In other cases, world government is not implied in this direct way, but 
endorsed by cosmopolitans, for example, because of the perceived inconveniences of state 
sovereignty (Cabrera, 2004), or because practically realising cosmopolitan ends is understood to 
require new administrative apparatus (Pogge, 2002). The argument in this paper reinforces the 
notion that realising cosmopolitan principles entails world government by offering another, 
novel, way to make the connection, and is therefore primarily directed at cosmopolitans who 
have remained ambivalent about, or indeed have explicitly rejected, radical institutional 
implications (e.g. Barry, 1998; Beitz, 1994; Brock, 2009; Brown, 2009; Tan, 2004; Ypi, 2012). 
It is important to make two points clearly out the outset. First, at no point in what follows 
am I suggesting that self-interested motives alone can motivationally sustain cosmopolitanism – to 
the contrary, my argument here assumes that a genuine and widespread moral commitment to 
cosmopolitan principles already pertains, and that the global population is prepared to 
understand itself as a political ‘community’ to which principles of justice apply; I will refer to this 
as an assumption of ‘cosmopolitan solidarity’. This, of course, is a counterfactual assumption, 
and for those concerned about the prospects for the realisation of cosmopolitan principles, the 
current lack of a widespread moral motivation is a pressing concern – it is just not the concern of 
this paper.3 Note also that such an assumption is necessary if one is interested in the question of 
cosmopolitan institutions, because without it, all such institutional proposals, however apparently 
modest or radical, are doomed to failure.   
Second, the exact status of the argument bears clarifying. I will offer three examples of 
self-interested motivations that might aid the realisation of a cosmopolitan condition were there to 
be world government. This is importantly different to offering self-interested reasons to create world 
government. The argument here is made in support of a particular cosmopolitan institutional ideal 
– it does not obviously tell us anything about how (or if) that institutional form itself might be 
                                                          
3 For thoughts on this issue, see Ulaş, 2015. 
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realised.4 Taken together, these two points clarify that I am here concerned with how, in the right 
institutional circumstances, self-interest might contribute to the stabilisation of a roughly 
cosmopolitan condition.5  
 
Economic self-interest 
A first way to think about self-interest in the global context is in terms of global economic 
integration. According to some, the best way to lift people out of poverty and reduce global 
inequalities is to progressively lower trade tariffs, end states’ protectionist trade policies (such as 
subsidies for domestic industries), and free up the movement of capital and labour, thereby 
creating a truly global marketplace and giving maximum expression to self-interested economic 
rationality on a global scale (e.g. Bhagwati, 2004; Wolf, 2005).  
Such global economic integration is claimed to be of universal benefit. Free trade, for 
example, offers states the opportunity to enjoy the gains of their comparative advantage, where 
the latter is explained via a simplified two state example, as follows. State1 should specialise in 
producing or providing the good that it is relatively most efficient at producing or providing, 
determined by reference to the ‘opportunity cost’ of producing that good compared to the 
opportunity cost for State2 of doing the same, and vice versa. Both states should specialise in this 
way regardless of whether or not they have an absolute advantage in the production cost of any 
good(s), because the price of each state’s comparative advantage good will in any case reliably be 
lower than the price of that good in the other state: resultantly, there will be a market for that 
good in the other state. The overall effect is to produce gains in access to both goods for both 
states. By extension, it is claimed that the effect of instituting global free trade would be to 
increase ‘gross world product’ while at the same time eradicating global poverty and reducing 
global inequality.  
                                                          
4 For some thoughts about how world government might come about, see: Archibugi and Held, 2011; 
Cabrera, 2010; Goodin, 2010; Goodin, 2013, Wendt 2003. 
5 In making this argument I make a pair of assumptions about feasibility. First, I assume that persons can 
be expected always to remain partially and importantly self-interested, even in conditions of cosmopolitan 
solidarity. In other words, I assume that to completely idealise away human self-interest would be to 
anticipate the impossible. By contrast, I assume that world government is not impossible in the same sense, 
even if currently clearly impractical. The distinction here is that between a ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ feasibility 
constraint respectively (Gilabert and Lawford-Smith, 2012).   
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Things are obviously rather more complex than this, and there exists a lively debate 
regarding the empirical bases of the link between global economic integration and reductions in 
global poverty and inequality, which I cannot hope to settle here.6 Moreover, there lurks a 
suspicion that the case for economic globalisation is less an impartial blueprint for global equality 
than a palatable cover for a pernicious ideology propounding the idea that poorer states have no 
one to blame but themselves if they cannot pull themselves up out of poverty. Such suspicions are 
given succour by the recognition that the beginnings of economic globalization seem often to be 
obviously anti-cosmopolitan. Indeed, even Martin Wolf, a supporter of the case, recognises that 
the actions of rich states within the WTO, asymmetrically enforcing the lowering of trade tariffs 
in developing states while maintaining their own heavy subsidies, are a “grotesquerie” (2005: 
215). Conscious of these concerns, here I will simply grant that full and reciprocally administered 
economic globalization is theoretically consistent with – and indeed could aid the realisation of – 
cosmopolitan principles, and ask what follows. My answer is that there are at least four 
considerations – two practical, and two ethical – that, taken together, point to world government 
as the most plausible institutional site for the realisation of any such cosmopolitan potential.   
The first arises from an acknowledgement that although economic integration might be 
mutually beneficial if we take the relevant units of analysis to be states, the facts may be 
otherwise if, in a more cosmopolitan spirit, we take the relevant units of analysis to be persons or 
sub-state groups. States are abstract corporate entities: to say a trade policy is in a particular 
state’s interest is merely to say that the numbers stack up nicely in the aggregate. But it does not 
follow that this aggregate-level economic rationalism will be internalised by individual citizens, 
especially given that an implication of the theory of comparative advantage is that various 
industries and business sectors – and thus jobs – in any one state should be lost. Admittedly, the 
theory also assumes that those who lose jobs in those industries will gain them in the industry in 
which the state has comparative advantage, but the assumption of full employment is a 
simplifying one that does not accord with reality, and in any case neglects to recognise the fact 
                                                          
6 For added complexity, see James (2012: Ch. 2). For an overview of some of the key points of 
contestation, see Luke Martell (2010: Ch. 8). For a detailed analysis of the contemporary shape and extent 
of economic globalisation, see Held and McGrew (2007). For scepticism regarding the extent to which 
global inequality and poverty have been reduced in recent years, see Pogge (2010).  
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that persons often relate to their jobs in more than economic terms, for example additionally 
seeing them as constitutive of personal and/or communal identity (consider the 20th century UK 
mining communities, for instance). 
Thus, those groups who stand to lose out as a result of their state re-organising to realise 
its comparative advantage can be expected to lobby against the latter occurring, and when such 
groups are sufficiently politically powerful the effect may be to preclude such a move. 
Agriculture, for instance, is an area of potential comparative advantage for many developing 
countries. However, the farming lobby in Europe (as in the US) is politically powerful and 
resultantly continues to benefit from subsidies and tariffs that, as case studies by various NGOs 
have shown, artificially buoy European farming at the expense of developing countries (e.g. 
ActionAid 2011; Fritz, 2011; Oxfam, 2004). Potential gains to the economies of poor states and 
the reduction of global poverty are thereby precluded.7  In the economic turbulence of recent 
years, states, facing internal political pressures, implemented a number of protectionist measures 
that effectively began to undo some of the economic integration that had already occurred, despite 
a warning from the WTO that such measures “will not solve their [economic] problems” (WTO, 
2012). 
Importantly, adding a counterfactual assumption of cosmopolitan solidarity, as I have 
indicated that we must, is unlikely to change this dynamic. Consider that an individual is 
distraught when they lose their livelihood regardless of whether that is on account of their 
industry moving elsewhere within their own state or beyond their state’s borders. Shipbuilding 
was ceased in the UK town of Portsmouth in 2013, with the loss of over one thousand jobs; those 
who lost their jobs were not far consoled by the fact they were reportedly ‘sacrificed’ in order to 
save the shipbuilding industry in Scotland rather than somewhere beyond the UK. In other 
words, a sense of political solidarity, which is assumed to hold already between compatriots, is 
not sufficient to overcome the priority of self-interest in cases like this. It follows that to assume a 
sense of cosmopolitan solidarity does not mean we are entitled to assume, in a global system of 
separate sovereign states, that there would not remain persistent calls to maintain trade barriers – 
                                                          
7 It remains to be seen what the eventual effect of the 2013 reforms to the EU’s Common Agricultural 
Policy will be, although they have been labelled a “missed opportunity” (Matthews, 2014).  
6 
 
 
or that there would not be persistent calls to re-raise trade barriers in a world in which economic 
integration had been tentatively achieved.  
The upshot of this can be set out with reference to Friedrich Hayek, from whom global 
economic integrationists’ faith in the market draws obvious inspiration. Hayek insisted that ‘the 
abrogation of national sovereignties and the creation of an effective international order of law’ is 
a necessary compliment to the liberal economic programme (Hayek, 1948: 269). And by appeal 
to an ‘effective international order of law’, Hayek in fact means a federal order with coercive 
central power, i.e. a federal (albeit minimal) state. Such a structure was perceived as necessary in 
order to constitutionally preclude economic relations between ‘nations organised as trading bodies’ 
(ibid: 226) – with its associated protectionist dispositions – which otherwise consistently threatens 
to re-arise on account of the sort of dynamic I have just outlined.  
Hayek moved directly to the federal state form because he understood this to be ‘the only 
way in which the ideal of international law can be made a reality’; without it, any appeal to 
international law is merely ‘expressing a pious wish’ (Hayek, 2001 [1944]: 239). Surveying the 
situation with the benefit of 70 years’ hindsight, and with some distance from the tumultuous 
period in which he was writing, a fully federal form may seem to us less vital, given experience of 
the novel institutional form of the European Union. On the other hand, given recent troubles, 
one might be tempted to enlist the EU as evidence of the desirability of genuine sovereign 
government in circumstances of economic integration (Verhofstadt and Cohn-Bendit, 2012). But 
even if the EU is evidence of the possibility of stabilised economic integration without sovereign 
government (a big ‘if’), it nevertheless also points, as a living example of an institutional form that 
resides conceptually between a confederal and federal order, toward the importance of the 
transcendence of the state system: the EU’s complex institutional structure, inclusive of the 
European Parliament and European Court of Justice, is clearly far removed the sorts of bi- and 
multi-lateral trade treaties that Hayek was dismissive of, and while it does not formally remove 
the right of unilateral exit for any one member state, the costs and risks of doing so are such that 
they are of a wholly different order to the simple reneging upon a discrete trade agreement. We 
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can then at least say that there appears to be a benefit to stability that comes from the enmeshing 
of economic integration with political integration.  
A second way of thinking about this link is to see some amount of political integration as 
an important pre-cursor to economic integration, or to see the genesis of the two as reiteratively 
connected. Consider this via reference to one of the three main tenets of global economic 
integration, the free movement of people/labour. Freedom of movement is of course not 
conceptually incompatible with a system of separate states. Nevertheless, the most fully realised 
system of open borders extant in the world today – the EU – arose, in its current form, only after 
some extensive political integration had occurred; the law that sustains European freedom of 
movement is not a series of unilateral commitments, nor a simple multilateral treaty, but rather 
an EU-level directive that involved the European parliament. This political integration, in its 
turn, was preceded by initial economic integration. One way of understanding this relationship is 
to say that the gradual and interactive elaboration of European political and economic 
institutions has rendered each more politically feasible; they are mutually supportive. Indeed, the 
free movement of persons is at once a political and economic construct; it is both a right held by 
European citizens, and a central tenet of the idea of economic integration.  
Another way of characterising the relationship is via reference to functionalist theories of 
integration, in which institutional ‘contradictions’ generate crises which  forcefully present the 
need for more integration, which then comes as a ‘spill-over effect’ rather than as an initially 
intended reform (Haas, 2008 [1964]). On this account, economic and political integration remain 
interlinked, but as a series of crises and resolutions rather than as mutually positively enabling.  
There is some justification for characterizing the development of the EU in this way (Eilstrup-
Sangiovanni, 2006), and indeed for seeing current troubles within the Eurozone at the latest 
iteration of this dynamic compelling greater integration.  
Both of the practical considerations I have presented lean on the single case of the 
European Union, and neither demonstrate conclusively that there could not be global economic 
integration without elements of world government. Nevertheless, both point to reasons to 
consider there to be a positive probabilistic link between political integration and the plausibility 
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of stable economic integration; the greater the extent of “stateness”, the better (Koenig-Archibugi, 
2011). Furthermore, it does seem to me that in any case there could not be ethically justified global 
economic integration without world government; ethically justified, that is, from a cosmopolitan 
perspective. This is important, because our aim here is to consider the prospects for harnessing 
self-interested motivations that are potentially consistent with moral cosmopolitanism in terms of 
the actions they motivate.  
The first ethical argument concerns the democratic implications of a globalised economy, 
and is revealed via recognition of what Dani Rodrik (2011a, 2011b) calls the political trilemma of 
the world economy. The trilemma makes clear that only two (any two) of the following three 
things can co-exist: separate states; global economic integration; and democratic politics. If we 
choose global economic integration, and want to retain separate states, then – because increased 
economic integration requires increased harmonisation of domestic regulatory standards – we 
must be committed to the shrinking scope of democratic politics; the demos in any one state 
cannot be empowered to select policies that diverge from international standards. States must 
don, and indeed are already accused of donning, a ‘golden straightjacket’ in order to be business-
friendly and attract capital investment (Friedman, 2000).   
Giving up on democracy is not a resolution of the trilemma that cosmopolitans are at 
liberty to select. The options are thus to give up on the idea of extensive international economic 
integration, blunting the extent to which self-interested economic rationality can aid the 
realisation of cosmopolitan ends, or to endorse both economic integration and democratic 
politics by sacrificing the domestic state system and “instituting federalism on a global scale” 
(Rodrik, 2011a: 68). Either way, it must be recognised that an appeal for global economic 
integration as a means of advancing cosmopolitan ends must, if it is to be democratically 
legitimate, at the same time be an appeal for world government. The EU can again be pointed to 
as an example to learn from, since it is regularly accused of operating with a ‘democratic deficit’ 
requiring the strengthening of the European parliament (e.g. Habermas, 2012). Global economic 
integration implemented by a purely intergovernmental organisation like the WTO would be 
even more susceptible to the democratic critique.  
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It might however be suggested that Rodrik’s trilemma is false, because separate states 
could each democratically decide to bind themselves to harmonised global regulatory standards: 
each state, that is, would democratically agree to shrink its own democratic remit. But here a 
dilemma arises: either the democratic agenda is shrunk decisively in a ‘one off’ vote in every 
state, in which case the question arises how this permanent restriction can be democratically 
justified to future generations; or every state perennially reopens the question of whether they 
wish to shrink their own economic remit, rendering global economic integration always tentative, 
volatile and highly vulnerable to the first practical problem set out above. Given that we are also 
assuming that persons have internalised a genuine sense of cosmopolitan commitment that we 
can understand as akin to the formation of a global demos, it’s also not clear that separate states 
would in any case any longer be understood as the appropriate democratic fora for settling the 
question.  
The second ethical consideration is the need to effectively mitigate a global market’s 
negative externalities. Consider, for just one example, the problem of environmental pollution.8 
Market transactions can have considerable adverse effects on the environment that are not 
incorporated into the cost of the transaction by the transacting parties. At the domestic level, 
governments can protect against such externalities by outlawing polluting practices, 
authoritatively ordering their rectification, levying taxes on polluting behaviour, and/or 
instituting and administering novel market-based solutions like emissions trading. At the global 
level, of course, there is no comparable, competent agency. In its absence, the mitigation of global 
environmental externalities like climate change depends upon state voluntarism and negotiation, 
which has so far lead to underwhelming results. Significantly, market-based solutions are 
themselves far more difficult because of this dependence – indeed, while a number of regional 
carbon ‘cap and trade’ schemes have enjoyed some success (Caney and Hepburn, 2011), it has 
not proven possible for states to create a genuinely global market in carbon credits, and hence to 
                                                          
8 Another possible negative externality is the economic inequality that free markets can give rise to. I do not 
emphasise this point here however, as I am granting that there may be a cosmopolitan case for economic 
globalisation.  
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set a globally recognised carbon price, let alone agree on a global cap in emissions within which a 
global trading system would operate.  
The difficulty of neutralising negative externalities without government can be further 
elucidated when we recognise that such neutralisation amounts to the provision of public goods, 
the latter being at the heart of the argument from prudential self-interest.  
 
Prudential Self-Interest 
Daniel Weinstock suggests that there are at least three prudential reasons for states to seek to 
limit inequality. These are:  
the spread of infectious disease …, the development of networks of global terrorists 
increasingly emboldened to carry out destructive actions in affluent countries, and … the 
degradation of the natural environment and the depletion of global natural resources. 
There are, in other words, “global public goods” – that is, goods that the world’s richest 
countries cannot obtain unless the needs of the global poor are catered to as well.  
   (2010: 183) 
 
We have reason to be concerned about living conditions in poorer states because, first, ‘there is a 
high correlation between poverty and poor hygienic conditions, and poor hygienic conditions are 
efficient breeding grounds for the proliferation of infectious diseases’ (ibid: 183) which spread 
across borders. Second, ‘it has been fairly well established that poverty and poor environmental 
practices co-exist in many countries in a vicious cycle, the impacts of which are impossible to 
contain within national boundaries’ (ibid: 184). Finally, there might be a causal link between 
global inequality and political extremism which would give affluent states self-interested reason 
to be concerned to alleviate that poverty (see also Held, 2004: 144). Weinstock concludes that 
therefore there may be ‘prudence-based arguments to be made for a global egalitarian agenda’ 
that do not necessitate ‘institutional bootstrapping’ (2010: 184).9 
                                                          
9 It is only the last prudent motivation Weinstock offers that actually speaks specifically of inequality. 
Nevertheless, any successful attempt to raise persons worldwide above a sufficientarian threshold must 
limit certain inequalities, lest they widen to the point at which, for example, the purchasing power of poorer 
states sinks below a level sufficient to secure certain goods (Ypi, 2012). Moreover, there are prudential 
arguments one can make that speak more obviously to a relational dimension. For example, immigration: 
citizens of rich countries who consider immigration into their country to be undesirable, and yet also 
recognise that a major reason for that immigration is the poorer standards of living in the immigrants’ 
countries of origin (even if above some minimum threshold), have self-interested reason to help improve 
those standards.  
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It’s not clear however that this is the case. As Weinstock recognises, better-off states are 
not concertedly acting upon the prudential logic he demonstrates, and are instead attempting to 
protect themselves against these effects by, for example, stockpiling antiviral drugs and tightening 
border controls. Why is this? Part of the reason will likely be that, as I have been emphasising, a 
self-interested motive alone is not sufficient to sustain actions in accordance with cosmopolitan 
justice. This is especially likely to be the case where a moral motive is not just missing but is, so 
to speak, pointing in the opposite direction. In general, persons not only do not accept a moral 
obligation to realise cosmopolitan principles of justice, they in fact have explicitly particularist 
moral commitments, in which the moral significance of the nation and/or state is emphasised, 
and on which basis cosmopolitanism is rejected. In such cases, there is a conflict between the self-
understood moral motive (which rejects the idea of cosmopolitan justice) and the prudential 
motive of self-interest (which may endorse it). Another reason these sorts of prudential arguments 
may not carry water is a lack of belief in the efficacy of inter-state ‘aid’. This belief may in some 
instances be well-grounded, but in other cases may stem from the suspicion and distrust 
characteristic of a lack of cosmopolitan moral solidarity.  
Given that we are assuming, counterfactually, that a widespread commitment to 
cosmopolitan principles pertains, we can set the above worries aside. An additional explanation 
is simply that the prudential arguments are not yet widely known and accepted. Weinstock 
himself believes that ‘would-be global demos builders’ should make such arguments explicit and 
‘draw up policy proposals that speak to them’ (2010: 190), the assumption apparently being that if 
such arguments were widely disseminated, they would and could be endorsed and acted upon.10 
But such a conclusion cannot be so straightforwardly drawn, even in circumstances of 
cosmopolitan solidarity. For it is not within any one state’s power to act upon the logic of the 
prudential arguments autonomously - at least not at reasonable cost to itself. A given state may 
come to understand the prudential argument for narrow global inequality, but nevertheless have 
                                                          
10 The former UK International Development Secretary Andrew Mitchell in fact articulated the prudential 
message particularly clearly: ‘If we had tackled the deep causes of poverty and dysfunctionality in Somalia 
and Afghanistan, we would not have to grapple with the symptoms today. These problems affect us here – 
terrorism, the drugs trade and illegal migration. If we want to tackle these problems at home, we have to 
understand and address their root causes abroad. Some people say we can’t afford to engage in 
international development, but we can’t afford not to’ (quoted in Grice, 2011). 
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neither the resources nor the organisational capacity, nor indeed the motivation, to do so 
unilaterally.  
Of course, Weinstock’s argument is intended to convince rich states that they should 
work together in this regard. But notice that Weinstock, in setting out of the prudential case, 
characterises it with explicit reference to the idea of global public goods; there are various global 
public goods the realisation of which depends upon improving the economic, social and 
infrastructural circumstances of poorer states (i.e. ‘weakest link’ public goods). This, however, 
amounts to saying that improving the economic and infrastructural circumstances of poorer states 
‘is itself a global public good; and one that, because it requires financing, is open to free riding’ 
(Barrett, 2007: 12). The phenomenon of ‘free riding’ is self-interest taken to its logical conclusion: 
collaborating with others to realise a mutual interest is good, but having those others realise that 
mutual interest without your having to contribute is even better. Thus, the appeal to prudence 
faces a well-recognised theoretical problem in current global institutional conditions, namely the 
difficulty of collective action to realise public goods in the absence of government.11  
Hypothesising cosmopolitan solidarity does not obviously help avoid this conclusion. In 
order for the collective action problem to be solved, it is necessary not just that each relevant 
agent be guided by the appropriate cosmopolitan motivation, but also that each agent be assured 
that every other agent is similarly motivated. Where agents cannot be so assured, they are liable to 
refrain from contributing themselves, even when they were initially minded to, both because they 
expect that the good won’t be realised without the contributions of those others, and because they 
want to avoid being the ‘sucker’, i.e. the agent whose contributions others free ride upon. The 
pertinent question is what it takes for agents to be sufficiently assured. Here John Rawls is 
instructive:  
The sense of justice leads us to promote just schemes and to do our share in them when we believe 
that others, or sufficiently many of them, will do theirs. But in normal circumstances a reasonable 
assurance in this regard can only be given if there is a binding rule effectively enforced... The need 
for the enforcement of rules by the state will still exist even when everyone is moved by the same 
sense of justice (1999 [1971], 236) 
                                                          
11 For two analyses of the problem of delivering global public goods with specific reference to international 
aid contributions see Steinwand, 2011; Mascarenhas and Sandler, 2006.   
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‘Binding rule effectively enforced’ is thought necessary because the internalisation of a particular 
sense of justice and willingness to act upon it does not and cannot itself bring with it an assurance 
that others are similarly motivated and willing. Indeed, in order for collective action problems to 
be reliably solved without the aid of institutional coercion, a deep level of relationship, of genuine 
friendship, seems to be required (Majolo et al, 2006). The ‘trust’ that purportedly pertains to a 
sense of political solidarity (Miller, 1995) is not qualitatively equivalent.  
 Of course, the international ‘state of nature’ is disanalogous to its individualist equivalent, 
because states, as political-legal standing achievements, have apparently been able to realise a 
legal condition ‘horizontally’, via the innovation of international law. Yet even if we grant that 
international law deserves its moniker as law (for doubts, see Goldsmith and Posner, 2005), 
what’s missing is “supranational power above competing states that would equip the 
international community with the executive and sanctioning powers required to implement and 
enforce its rules and decisions” (Habermas, 2006: 132). For those, like Habermas, who reject 
global sovereignty, it’s not clear how this circle is to be squared. In lieu of an answer, 
international law struggles to provide global public goods as best it can, but remains in many 
instances ineffective (Goldin, 2013).  
Indeed, one might suggest that ‘binding law effectively enforced’ is all the more likely to 
be important in the context which concerns us here than the Rawlsian one. For while Rawls was 
concerned to stabilise just outcomes via reference to a shared sense of justice alone, here we are 
considering, additionally, self-interested motivations – and if self-interest is explicitly part of the 
shared public justification for contributing to global public good provision, agents will be 
mutually wary of the possibility of that self-interest tipping over into a desire to free ride.  
Furthermore, it seems unlikely that any sense of moral commitment that eventually arises in the 
global context will be more potent – more like friendship – than that which has arisen in the 
domestic context, given that resources such as a shared cultural identity would not obviously be 
available, as they are claimed to be in, say, the national context. In sum, we should recognise that 
even with the addition (missing in Weinstock’s account) of a widespread genuine sense of 
cosmopolitan motivation, it is not obvious that the prudential argument for the provision of 
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global public goods will be successful in the existing institutional constellation. In order to 
activate the logic of the prudential arguments, some form of genuinely binding global law that, 
unlike international law, is impartially created and reliably enforced, would be of significant 
benefit (Lee, 2010).  
 
Democratic Self-Interest 
In this last section I want to underscore the instrumental value of global democracy to 
cosmopolitan ends, specifically by way of reference to self-interest. I mean here to say nothing 
about whether the value of democracy, global or otherwise, can also be defended in intrinsic 
terms. Nor do I say that the instrumental argument at hand here is the only one available. The 
point is only to make clear that one particular instrumental argument for global democracy can 
be made both positively and negatively, and that when the negative version is recognised, the 
instrumental importance of global democracy (and hence world government) to cosmopolitan 
ends is felt all the more keenly.  
 Democratic societies maintain for their citizens the right to vote – enabling the citizenry 
to select (and de-select) representatives – together with a number of other related rights such as 
the right to free speech, assembly, and legal challenge. “In such an institutional context, 
individuals are enabled to appropriately challenge political power holders through forms of protest 
and expression, and to chasten them through formal electoral processes and, significantly, in 
courts or through ombuds processes” (Cabrera, 2014: 236). Empirical evidence can be marshalled 
to show that these rights and mechanisms make a difference to the protection of widely 
recognised human rights (Sen, 1999; Christiano, 2011). This can be couched in terms of the 
positive pursuit of self-interest: a democratic system allows all to lobby for their own interests in a 
way that is instrumentally useful for the realisation of at least a sufficientarian distributive 
outcome.12  
                                                          
12 Of course, real world democratic regimes do not produce exactly the results one might expect them to on 
paper. Consider, for example, that poorer citizens in democratic states, even where they apparently form a 
potential majority, often fail to use their votes in ways that would serve their own interests optimally, or 
indeed to use their votes at all. Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that one would wish to deny that a 
democratic political system – even the imperfect, far from ideal systems we have experience of in practice – 
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 But democracy where? Globalised democracy can be understood in two senses. The first 
refers to the reiterative democratisation of separate states, with no transnational or globally 
extensive democratic institutions implied. The second refers specifically to a vision of democratic 
processes replicated at the global level; a global parliament, with global representatives of a global 
constituency of world citizens with democratic rights and freedoms. When the instrumental 
argument for democracy is considered only in the above positive form, there is no obvious reason 
to favour truly global democracy over the a world of separate democratic states: if democracy 
protects basic rights, then why should it matter whether there are lots of separate democracies, or 
one? But there is also a negative version of the instrumental argument to be made: without 
democracy in a given political context, the self-interest of some can overcome the interests of 
others in a way that hinders the latter from realising their basic rights and/or precludes a just 
outcome.  
 Such an argument is set out a global level by Luis Cabrera, who emphasises the problem 
presented by ‘a set of interconnected biases, naturally arising in a states system’: 
The biases serve as powerful forces working against distributions not only of resources and 
opportunities to outsiders, but also against extending fully fair terms of trade and investment, 
equitable aid conditionalities, responsibilities to address climate change and other threats. Biases 
include an electoral or stakeholder one, where domestic leaders have strong incentives to tend to 
the interests of their own constituents first and routinely ignore those of outsiders. Self-interest and 
a more subtle own-case bias arise at the level of the collective or polity. Polities are left to be the 
judges of their own obligations in a global system lacking a neutral suprastate judge or forum 
where salient decisions can be challenged from outside the states taking them. Thus, they face few 
systematic challenges to acting from plain self-interest (Cabrera, 2014: 240).   
The upshot of the negative argument is that truly global democracy is necessary if the dynamic 
expressed by the positive version of the argument is to be accessible in the global context.13  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
is preferable to a non-democratic system, and part of the reason for this is its tendency to produce superior 
outcomes from the perspective of justice relative to alternatives. 
13 Obviously, any global democracy is also likely to be imperfect in practice – but again, my thought is that 
even an imperfect global democracy is better than no global democracy. One may in fact be tempted to 
argue that global democracy faces more difficulty here on account of the current lack of a plausible ‘global 
demos’, by which is meant that the global population does not understand itself as a political community 
and so global democratic institutions will not be accepted as legitimate (e.g. Miller, 2009). But that would 
16 
 
 
 Cabrera claims that biases are ‘naturally arising’ in a multi-state system, and it might be 
thought that that is too strong a statement. More specifically, given that I have been at pains to 
emphasise the assumption of a sense of genuine cosmopolitan commitment, might it not be the 
case that the negative dynamic can be overcome without radical institutional implications? 
Consider, for example, a theory of ‘statist cosmopolitanism’ that emphasises the possibility that 
separate states undergo reiterative transformations such that each becomes a committed agent of 
cosmopolitan justice (Ypi, 2012). In this vein, one might argue that where a genuine 
cosmopolitan commitment was internalised the present instrumental appeal to democratic self-
interest would be unnecessary (even if global democracy still has other instrumental and intrinsic 
value). However, enabling each individual to democratically pursue their self-interest is useful for 
cosmopolitanism not only because it can encourage authorities to react to the needs of the 
citizenry, but also because, in political contexts, self-interest is almost always a more potent 
sentiment than interest in others, regardless of the additional presence of moral motivations. 
To see this, first consider the distinction Elaine Scarry (1996) has made between 
‘imagining’ and ‘including’ others. Scarry characterises an appeal for a cosmopolitan ethic as an 
attempt to persuade us to extend our imagination to include distant others, bearing in mind their 
‘full weight’ and ‘solidity’ – the fact that they are real agents, have life goals, have loves, feel 
injury, suffer – when making decisions that are likely to affect them. While these are obviously 
worthy intentions, the problem is that ‘imagining’ or ‘remembering’ others in this ongoing 
manner is in fact highly psychologically demanding. To demonstrate this, Scarry first refers to 
Jean-Paul Sartre’s study of the imagination, in which he asks the reader to close their eyes and 
attempt to conjure up in their imagination the face of a loved one. Scarry then asks us to: 
Transport the problems of trying to imagine a single friend to the imaginative labor of 
knowing the other – not an intimate friend, not any single person at all, but instead five, or 
ten, or one hundred, or one hundred thousand; or x, the number of Turks residing in 
Germany; or y, the number of illegal aliens living in the United States; or z, the estimated 
number of Iraqi citizens killed in our bombing raids; or 70 million, the scale of population 
that stands to suffer should the United States fire a nuclear missile[.]   
 (Scarry, 1996: 103)  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
be to ignore the assumption we are working with here, which is that there does indeed exist a widespread 
sense of cosmopolitan commitment which can enable a global population to understand itself as a demos.  
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Clearly, the ‘imagining’ that is required here is different to that in the case of bringing to mind the 
face of a friend. But just as the face of a friend is inevitably faded and two-dimensional in our 
mind’s eye, so it proves difficult to empathetically and consistently ‘imagine’ the lives of millions 
of others, regardless of an earnest intention to do so.  And where our imagination falters, we are 
liable to neglect the effects on others of our actions and omissions. 
This calls to mind Adam Smith’s infamous statement that a ‘man of humanity in Europe’ 
is nevertheless more readily upset by a ‘paltry misfortune’ to himself than the ‘ruin of a hundred 
million of his brethren’ in China (2002 [1759]: 157–8). Smith’s point, as Fonna Forman-Barzilai 
puts it, is that ‘we are sentimentally near-sighted’ (Forman-Barzilai, 2010: 50). This near-
sightedness is chronic; it applies already within states as well as across them, which is to say that 
any sense of national solidarity and moral commitment that pertains within a state will not in 
itself be sufficient, absent the state’s coercive institutions, to stabilise outcomes consistent with the 
demands of justice. It is incredible that the suffering of unknown others, even great suffering, 
could affect us with the same intensity as our own suffering, or even our own worries, concerns 
and preoccupations. That is particularly so of those others with whom we have little interaction 
and are thus rarely ‘reminded’ of in the first place. 
In this vein, Jacob Schiff has outlined three aggravating psychological factors for the 
problem of ongoing acknowledgement of global structural injustice and our political 
responsibilities to distant others, factors that persist even where such injustice and responsibility is 
accepted in moral-intellectual terms. These are: the Arendtian problem of our ‘thoughtlessness’, 
or failure of conscience, which is both fostered institutionally (as when sweatshops are “insulated 
from public view” by the distance placed between producer and consumer) and is also a “quasi-
natural, practically necessary feature of political life”, because it shields us against a reality which 
would otherwise be psychologically overwhelming (2008: 104); Sartre’s notion of ‘bad faith’, our 
continued susceptibility to deliberately mislead ourselves about the reality of, and our implication 
in, moral wrongs; and Bourdieu’s concept of misrecognition, in which our everyday lived 
experience of structural injustice renders it habitual and ‘ordinary’, and “as it becomes 
thoughtlessly taken for granted and naturalised, causes our harmful activities to recede from view 
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– to be forgotten” (ibid: 101). Like thoughtlessness, these last two psychological ‘modes of 
covering up’ are understood to be in some sense essential features of human experience.  
There is also psychological evidence to suggest that imagining the other may not 
necessarily reliably lead to altruistic behaviour, depending on precisely how that imagining is 
conducted. For instance, although directly ‘imagining how the other feels’ can lead to empathetic 
concern and related motivation to alleviate suffering, imagining oneself in the other’s place may 
lead to personal distress on the part of the imaginer (Batson, 2009). And while one may be lead 
one to undertake ‘altruistic’ action in order to end such personal distress (Cabrera, 2010: 242), 
one may alternatively be motivated only to remove oneself from the situation in which they are 
confronted with the suffering (Batson et al, 1987). What seems to make the difference here is the 
‘ease of escape’ from observance of the other: when escape is not easy, one suffering personal 
distress will be motivated to act ‘altruistically’ in order to minimise their own negative affect; but 
when escape is easier, it is likely that the observer’s reaction will simply be to exit the situation 
(Klimecki and Singer, 2012: 372). Unfortunately, as regards the suffering of often very distant 
others with which cosmopolitanism is concerned, escape is very easy: it may involve little more 
than turning over the TV channel, or even just avoiding making an effort to find out about that 
suffering in the first place.  
 It follows from these sorts of worries about our ongoing capacities of imagination that it is 
at best highly inefficient to leave ‘the fate of another person to be contingent on the generosity 
and wisdom of the imaginer’ (Scarry, 1996: 106). For Scarry, in the domestic context at least, the 
appropriate response is instead to structure society such that ‘no group any longer occupies the 
position of legal other’ by activating the ‘principle of self-representation’ (ibid: 107). Democratic 
inclusion negates the need for over-optimistic sole reliance on the successful imagining of one 
group by another. However, Scarry does not follow her own argument through as one might 
expect in the global context, claiming that ‘[w]hile it is possible to eliminate the legal position of 
the Other within a country, it is not possible to do so for people outside its borders’ (ibid: 108). 
But of course it is only true that the position of legal other is ineradicable if we assume that 
borders (circumscribing differing legal regimes) are themselves ineradicable. Admittedly that is 
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the sensible assumption to make if one is attempting to offer a short- to medium-term practical 
political proposal. But nevertheless, state borders are not natural facts about the world that 
cannot be changed. It is not genuinely impossible to eliminate the position of legal other; the 
institution of global democracy could achieve just such elimination. (This is not to say, of course, 
that there could not also remain distinct demoi below the global level, as there are in federal units 
in a domestic federal state.) And if one is engaged not in the development of any political 
proposal, but instead, as we are here, in consideration of cosmopolitan institutional ideals, then 
Scarry’s institutional conservatism, in which she speaks only of the ‘self-revision’ of states in 
order to ‘prepare for a more generous [i.e. more cosmopolitan] future’ (ibid: 110) – clearly calling 
to mind Ypi’s ‘statist cosmopolitanism’ – is inappropriate, since it amounts to a rejection of the 
idea of self-representation which was fundamental to her earlier argument, and in essence falls back 
upon the idea of ‘imaginatively’ including others.  
 Whether democratic self-representation at the global level must imply a global state (e.g. 
Marchetti, 2008), or instead only an intermediary institutional construct that sits somewhere 
between a global state and a multi-state system (e.g. Archibugi, 2008), is not something I can go 
into here. Either way, a central aspect of world government – a substantive democratic legislature 
– is required if democratic self-interest is to be a positive rather than negative factor with respect 
to the realisation of cosmopolitan ends.   
 
Conclusion 
If cosmopolitanism is ever to be a plausible ethic, there must come to pertain a widely shared 
attachment to cosmopolitan moral principles that can help motivate and sustain actions in 
accordance with cosmopolitan morality. I have said nothing here about how and whether that 
could come to pass. Rather, I have suggested that there potentially exists an additional, 
complimentary, and overlooked source of motivation for action in accordance with cosmopolitan 
obligations, namely self-interest. However, I have also argued that, in three instances, if self-
interest is to play this complimentary role, some form of world government is implied or 
necessitated. This may feel like an excruciating conclusion, combining a pragmatic initial thought 
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with a radical institutional form. But recall that many cosmopolitans already believe that the 
realisation of cosmopolitan principles points in the direction of world government; for such 
people, the argument in this paper can simply be understood as an additional reason to support 
that conclusion.  
Things are trickier for those cosmopolitans who are ambivalent about or have explicitly 
rejected the need for world government. I have highlighted a number of self-interested 
motivations that, so I argue, will be much harder to usefully harness without a world 
government, and indeed in such circumstances may point in an anti-cosmopolitan direction. And 
one might well suggest that, however impractical and idealistic a world government seems, it is 
less idealistic than assuming either that cosmopolitan ends could be sustained without the 
pragmatic bolsters provided by motivations of self-interest, or more optimistically still, that 
humanity could at some point be rid of self-interest entirely, and reliably act from pure 
cosmopolitan moral motivation. This, at least, is a dilemma – between institutional and 
motivational idealisations – that cosmopolitanism must grapple with.   
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